Institutional 'gaming' involving staff turnover during recent research evaluation exercises by UK Russell Group universities

被引：0

作者：

Harris, Richard ^{[1
]}

Mate-Sanchez-Val, Mariluz ^{[2
]}

Marin, Manuel Ruiz ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Durham, Business Sch, Dept Econ, Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, England

[2] Univ Politecn Cartagena Murcia, Dept Econ Accounting & Finance, Cartagena 30201, Spain

[3] Univ Politecn Cartagena Murcia, Dept Quantitat Methods Modern Languages & Law, Cartagena 30201, Spain

来源：

OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 2024年

关键词：

research assessment exercises; academic hiring; UK universities; I23; D22; J23; J78; PERFORMANCE-MEASUREMENT;

D O I：

10.1093/oep/gpae032

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

There is limited evidence on the extent to which UK universities institutionally 'game' the system with respect to periodic research assessment exercises (i.e. RAE/REF), that is, the hiring (and leaving) of staff before the cut-off census date to enhance institutional returns. Population panel data from the Higher Educational Statistical Agency (HESA) for 2004/05-2019/20 are used to consider the extent to which the numbers of 'starters', 'movers', and 'exits' specifically responded to the RAE/REF cycle. Confining the analysis to full professors, a random effects (RE) multinomial logit model was estimated that shows, after taking account of the importance of other covariates, strong evidence of a 2008 and (in particular) 2014 cycle, but no evidence of any upturn in overall hires (or declines in exiting) in the period preceding the 2021 REF census date. Institutional 'gaming' therefore seems to have been absent during the most recent REF.

引用

页码：427 / 444

页数：19