Local land regulatory governance and land transaction prices: Micro evidence from land audits

被引:1
作者
Feng, Chen [1 ]
Tao, Yunqing [2 ]
Zhang, Yan [1 ]
Zhu, Xingshu [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Econ & Finance, Xian 710061, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[3] Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Finance & Taxt, Hangzhou 310018, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[4] Inst Local Finance Res, Key Res Ctr Philosophy & Social Sci Zhejiang Prov, Hangzhou 310018, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Land supervision; Land audits; Industrial lands; Commercial and residential lands; STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES; CORRUPTION; CHINA; POLICY; IMPACTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.eap.2024.08.011
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It is of great significance to explore the role of land supervision in the standardization of local land transactions. We document the DID strategy to systematically evaluate how land audits affect the transactions in the land market. The results show that: (1) land audits have restrained the transactions of low price of industrial lands and the high price of commercial and residential lands, raised the unit price of industrial lands transactions, and reduced the price of commercial and residential lands, and these effects would not exist in the public sectors land transactions; (2) the impacts of land audits are more pronounced in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and enterprises with large-scale operations and high capital intensity; (3) audits have overall positive significance, which has increased the total investment of local industrial enterprises and reduced the investment bubble. However, there are no deterrent effects. The conclusions have important implications for our understanding of the loss of lands and resources, supervision, and the standardized construction of the trading market.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 18
页数:18
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