EXPERIENCE AND CONTENT

被引:132
作者
Byrne, Alex [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
PERCEPTION;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.614.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The 'content view', in slogan, form, is 'Perceptual experiences hate representational content'. I explain why, the content view should be reformulated to remote any reference, to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is litre. One corollay of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the coated view are partially vindicated because perceptual error is due to false belief.
引用
收藏
页码:429 / 451
页数:23
相关论文
共 37 条
[1]  
ALSTON W, 1999, PHILOS PERSPECT, V13, P181
[2]  
ARMSTRON DM, 1968, MAT THEORY MIND, P221
[3]  
BBENNETT J, 1988, EVENTS THEIR NAMES, P6
[4]   Perception and content [J].
Brewer, Bill .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 2006, 14 (02) :165-181
[5]  
Byrne A, 2001, PHILOS REV, V110, P199, DOI 10.1215/00318108-110-2-199
[6]  
BYRNE A, 2008, DISJUNCTIVISM PERCEP, P82
[7]  
Chisholm R. M., 1957, Perceiving: A philosophical study
[8]  
DAVIES M, 1991, MIND, V100, P461
[9]  
Evans Gareth, 1982, VARIETIES REFERENCE, P227
[10]  
Farrell B.A., 1950, Mind, V59, P170, DOI DOI 10.1093/MIND/LIX.234.170