机构:
Henan Polytech Univ, Res Ctr Energy Econ, Sch Business Adm, Jiaozuo 454003, Peoples R ChinaHenan Polytech Univ, Res Ctr Energy Econ, Sch Business Adm, Jiaozuo 454003, Peoples R China
Xu, Chuanyang
[1
]
Zhao, Wanting
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机构:
Henan Polytech Univ, Res Ctr Energy Econ, Sch Business Adm, Jiaozuo 454003, Peoples R ChinaHenan Polytech Univ, Res Ctr Energy Econ, Sch Business Adm, Jiaozuo 454003, Peoples R China
Zhao, Wanting
[1
]
Feng, Zhongwei
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机构:
Henan Polytech Univ, Res Ctr Energy Econ, Sch Business Adm, Jiaozuo 454003, Peoples R ChinaHenan Polytech Univ, Res Ctr Energy Econ, Sch Business Adm, Jiaozuo 454003, Peoples R China
Feng, Zhongwei
[1
]
机构:
[1] Henan Polytech Univ, Res Ctr Energy Econ, Sch Business Adm, Jiaozuo 454003, Peoples R China
In bimatrix games with symmetric triangular fuzzy payoffs, our work defines an (alpha, beta)-risk aversion Nash equilibrium ((alpha, beta)-RANE) and presents its sufficient and necessary condition. Our work also discusses the relationships between the (alpha, beta)-RANE and a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) in a bimatrix game with a risk-averse player 2 and certain payoffs. Finally, considering 2 x 2 bimatrix games with STFPs, we find the conditions where the increase in player 2's risk-aversion level hurts or benefits himself/herself.
机构:
Nagoya City Univ, Grad Sch Humanities & Social Sci, Mizuho Ku, 1 Yamanohata,Mizuho Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4678501, JapanNagoya City Univ, Grad Sch Humanities & Social Sci, Mizuho Ku, 1 Yamanohata,Mizuho Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4678501, Japan
机构:
Nagoya City Univ, Grad Sch Humanities & Social Sci, Mizuho Ku, 1 Yamanohata,Mizuho Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4678501, JapanNagoya City Univ, Grad Sch Humanities & Social Sci, Mizuho Ku, 1 Yamanohata,Mizuho Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4678501, Japan