Impact of Risk Aversion in Fuzzy Bimatrix Games

被引：0
作者：
Xu, Chuanyang [1 ]
Zhao, Wanting [1 ]
Feng, Zhongwei [1 ]
机构：
[1] Henan Polytech Univ, Res Ctr Energy Econ, Sch Business Adm, Jiaozuo 454003, Peoples R China
来源：
AXIOMS | 2024年 / 13卷 / 07期
关键词：
risk aversion; (alpha; beta)-risk aversion Nash equilibrium; fuzzy set theory; MATRIX GAMES; EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY; ZERO-SUM; PROSPECT-THEORY; PAYOFFS; NUMBERS;
D O I：
10.3390/axioms13070469
中图分类号：
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号：
070104 ;
摘要：
In bimatrix games with symmetric triangular fuzzy payoffs, our work defines an (alpha, beta)-risk aversion Nash equilibrium ((alpha, beta)-RANE) and presents its sufficient and necessary condition. Our work also discusses the relationships between the (alpha, beta)-RANE and a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) in a bimatrix game with a risk-averse player 2 and certain payoffs. Finally, considering 2 x 2 bimatrix games with STFPs, we find the conditions where the increase in player 2's risk-aversion level hurts or benefits himself/herself.
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页数：10
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