Inference to the Best Explanation, Dutch Books, and Inaccuracy Minimisation

被引：51

作者：

Douven, Igor ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Groningen, NL-9700 AB Groningen, Netherlands

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2013年 / 63卷 / 252期

关键词：

OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION; ASSERTION; PRAGMATICS;

D O I：

10.1111/1467-9213.12032

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Bayesians have traditionally taken a dim view of the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), arguing that, if IBE is at variance with Bayes' rule, then it runs afoul of the dynamic Dutch book argument. More recently, Bayes' rule has been claimed to be superior on grounds of conduciveness to our epistemic goal. The present paper aims to show that neither of these arguments succeeds in undermining IBE.

引用

页码：428 / 444

页数：17

共 32 条

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Boyd Richard., 1984, SCI REALISM, P41, DOI [10.1525/9780520337442-004, DOI 10.1525/9780520337442-004]

[2] Inference to the best explanation made coherent [J].