Theories of Democratic Backsliding

被引：8

作者：

Grillo, Edoardo ^{[1
]}

Luo, Zhaotian ^{[2
]}

Nalepa, Monika ^{[2
]}

Prato, Carlo ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Padua, Dept Econ & Management, Padua, Italy

[2] Univ Chicago, Dept Polit Sci, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

[3] Columbia Univ, Dept Polit Sci, New York, NY 10027 USA

来源：

ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE | 2024年 / 27卷

关键词：

democratic backsliding; formal modeling; executive aggrandizement; electoral manipulation; OPPOSITION;

D O I：

10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-025352

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

We review recent contributions to the modeling of democratic backsliding. We organize these theories according to (a) the source of constraints on the executive (vertical or horizontal restrainers) and (b) the target of backsliding (electoral manipulation or executive aggrandizement), and then use these concepts to build a scaffold for a meta-model of democratic backsliding. This meta-model allows us to describe and compare the premises and insights of this scholarship. We further apply our two-dimensional classification to more than 30 empirical papers and show how these theories can guide research design. We conclude by highlighting open issues for future research.

引用

页码：381 / 400

页数：20

共 74 条

[1] Why Don't Partisans Sanction Electoral Malpractice? [J].