Changing risk-taking: the effects of tasks and incentives on the variability of risk-taking

被引:1
作者
Soane, Emma [1 ]
Aufegger, Lisa [2 ]
机构
[1] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Management, Houghton St, London, England
[2] Imperial Coll London, Dept Surg & Canc, London, England
关键词
Risk-taking; activation; incentives; variability; ACTIVATION THEORY; PERSONALITY; PAY; BONUS; COMPENSATION; PREFERENCES; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; SCHEMES; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1080/13669877.2024.2387349
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
The capability to vary risk-taking is an important aspect of performance in organizations where behavioral adjustments are required to suit changing objectives. Incentive schemes are one way to influence risk-taking. Yet, evidence indicates incentives do not have their intended effects and may encourage excessive risk-taking. To examine this issue, we draw on compensation activation theory that proposes individual motives are activated by specific features of compensation schemes and expressed in behaviors. We extend compensation activation theory by focusing on (1) responses to a sequence of tasks designed to activate risk-taking and (2) the effects of incentive schemes on these relationships. We conducted a laboratory experiment with 173 participants who were allocated randomly to one of three bonus schemes. The linear scheme has a linear relationship between returns from risk-taking and rewards. The bonus cap scheme operates similarly up to a point where no further rewards are paid. The outcome-adjusted scheme, with a two-year hypothetical time frame, requires realized gains for the first year of investment and no losses in next year. Results support our hypotheses that these incentive schemes have differential effects on the strength and direction of relationships between risk-taking across a sequence of tasks. The linear scheme strengthens the relationships between risk-taking across sequential tasks. Conversely, the bonus cap scheme weakens the relationships between risk-taking across sequential tasks. The outcome-adjusted scheme creates variability by decreasing risk-taking when the connections between risk-taking and rewards are less salient and increasing risk-taking when connections between risk-taking and rewards are more salient. We contribute to the literature concerning compensation activation and incentives by deepening our understanding of the roles played by tasks and incentives in activation processes and by explaining the variability of risk-taking in terms of changes in connections between behavior and rewards.
引用
收藏
页码:581 / 596
页数:16
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