Reduction and emergence in philosophy of mind: physicalism and the explanatory gap

被引:0
|
作者
Escobedo, J. Arturo [1 ]
Sebastian, Miguel Angel [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Nacl Autonoma Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico
[2] Univ Nacl Autonoma Mexico, Inst Invest Filosof, Mexico City, Mexico
来源
REVISTA DE HUMANIDADES DE VALPARAISO-RHV | 2024年 / 25期
关键词
reductive explanation; a priori entailment; phenomenal consciousness; weak emergence; strong emergence;
D O I
10.22370/rhv2024iss25pp75-90
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
Our conscious experiences seem to elude any explanation in scientific terms. They present paradigmatic case of reduction failure and they are the main motivation for postulating relations of emergence. Thus, various authors have pointed out that phenomenal properties must be something more than mere collections of physical properties. This leads to the rejection of physicalism. As a consequence, phenomenal properties either have to be added to the list of fundamental properties, or emerge from them. Alternatively, the physicalist must be able to explain how that failure in the explanation can be compatible with their position. The aim of this paper is to clarify the concepts of reduction and emergence in the context of this debate in philosophy of mind, clearly distinguishing different types of epistemological relationships and their ontological consequences. This will allow us to have a better understanding of the commitments and the challenges different positions face.
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页码:75 / 90
页数:16
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