Strategic priority-based course allocation

被引：0

作者：

Romero-Medina, Antonio ^{[1
]}

Triossi, Matteo ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ, Getafe 28903, Madrid, Spain

[2] Ca Foscari Univ Venice, Venice Sch Management, Cannaregio 873, I-30121 Venice, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2024年 / 226卷

关键词：

Conditional acceptance; Immediate acceptance; Multi-unit assignment problem; Stability; APPROXIMATE COMPETITIVE-EQUILIBRIUM; SCHOOL-CHOICE; NASH IMPLEMENTATION; AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION; STABILITY; DESIGN; MECHANISM;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106701

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We introduce the conditional acceptance mechanism for solving the course allocation problem under priorities. This mechanism implements the set of stable allocations in both Nash equilibrium and undominated Nash equilibrium when preferences and priorities are substitutable. We model a post-allocation adjustment mechanism using a repeated version of the conditional acceptance mechanism that mitigates the inefficiencies caused by deviating from equilibrium. Both mechanisms are straightforward to implement, simplify the elicitation of students' preferences, and share features with currently employed course allocation mechanisms.

引用

页数：16

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