Issuance Policies of Route Origin Authorization with a Single Prefix and Multiple Prefixes: A Comparative Analysis
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作者:
Lai, Zetong
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机构:
Jinan Univ, Dept Cyber Secur, Guangzhou, Peoples R ChinaJinan Univ, Dept Cyber Secur, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
Lai, Zetong
[1
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Yan, Zhiwei
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机构:
China Internet Network Informat Ctr, Natl Engn Lab Naming & Addressing, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaJinan Univ, Dept Cyber Secur, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
Yan, Zhiwei
[2
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Geng, Guanggang
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Jinan Univ, Dept Cyber Secur, Guangzhou, Peoples R ChinaJinan Univ, Dept Cyber Secur, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
Geng, Guanggang
[1
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Nakazato, Hidenori
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Waseda Univ, Fac Sci & Engn, Tokyo, JapanJinan Univ, Dept Cyber Secur, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
Nakazato, Hidenori
[3
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机构:
[1] Jinan Univ, Dept Cyber Secur, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
[2] China Internet Network Informat Ctr, Natl Engn Lab Naming & Addressing, Beijing, Peoples R China
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a solution to mitigate the security issues faced by inter-domain routing. Within the RPKI framework, Route Origin Authorization (ROA) plays a crucial role as an RPKI object. ROA allows address space holders to place a single IP address prefix or multiple IP address prefixes in it. However, this feature has introduced security risks during the global deployment of RPKI. In this study, we analyze the current status of ROA issuance and discuss the impact of using two ROA issuance policies on RPKI security and synchronization efficiency. Based on the aforementioned work, recommendations are proposed for the utilization of ROA issuance policies.