The cost of debt around the IPO

被引:0
作者
Suleiman, David [1 ]
机构
[1] Franklin Univ Switzerland, Div Business & Econ, Sorengo, Switzerland
关键词
Initial public offering; Cost of debt; Information asymmetries; Bargaining power; LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; INFORMATION; BANKS; DETERMINANTS; MULTIPLE; CHOICE; SINGLE;
D O I
10.1108/MF-01-2022-0046
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
PurposeThe purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence on a possible economic explanation for changes in borrowing costs of US private firms that are going public.Design/methodology/approachUsing an OLS regression with firm fixed effects and the IPO as an information releasing event that alters information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and relying on several proxies for pre-IPO information asymmetries, I analyze the impact of the IPO on changes in borrowing costs from before to right after an IPO of firms with high pre-IPO information asymmetries.FindingsMy findings indicate that small firms, firms with high R&D, firms with negative EBITDA and firms with a single lending relationship benefit more from going public by realizing larger decreases in borrowing costs after an IPO than firms with lower pre-IPO information asymmetries. The results are consistent with changing information asymmetries caused by the IPO event playing a role in changes in borrowing costs after the IPO. Furthermore, I provide empirical evidence that a reduction in the lender's bargaining power due to the IPO event plays an important role in explaining changes in borrowing costs around that time.Originality/valueThis study uses a hand-collected data set of loans obtained from financial statements issued by US firms at the time of their IPO. As a result, I am able to comprehensively document changes of borrowing costs of US private firms going public and shed light on one of the economic forces behind those changes.
引用
收藏
页码:2031 / 2046
页数:16
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