Sponsored Question Answering

被引:1
作者
Mordo, Tommy [1 ]
Tennenholtz, Moshe [1 ]
Kurland, Oren [1 ]
机构
[1] Technion, Haifa, Israel
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2024 ACM SIGIR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE THEORY OF INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, ICTIR 2024 | 2024年
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
question answering; auctions; sponsored question answering; AUCTIONS;
D O I
10.1145/3664190.3672517
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
The potential move from search to question answering (QA) ignited the question of how should the move from sponsored search to sponsored QA look like. We present the first formal analysis of a sponsored QA platform. The platform fuses an organic answer to a question with an ad to produce a so called sponsored answer. Advertisers then bid on their sponsored answers. Inspired by Generalized Second Price Auctions (GSPs), the QA platform selects the winning advertiser, sets the payment she pays, and shows the user the sponsored answer. We prove an array of results. For example, advertisers are incentivized to be truthful in their bids; i.e., set them to their true value of the sponsored answer. The resultant setting is stable with properties of VCG auctions.
引用
收藏
页码:167 / 173
页数:7
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