Bankruptcy reforms and corporate debt structure

被引:3
作者
Liu, Xiaotian [1 ]
Qi, Yaxuan [2 ]
Wan, Wai Yee [3 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Accounting, 1900 Wenxiang Rd, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] City Univ Hong Kong, Sch Law, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Bankruptcy law; Debt structure; Borrowing cost; Creditor rights; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; SECURED CREDITORS; ENFORCEMENT; RIGHTS; DETERMINANTS; FIRM; CODES; LAW;
D O I
10.1016/j.intfin.2024.102044
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A growing number of jurisdictions have adopted bankruptcy law reforms to facilitate debt restructuring. Using a difference-in-differences model based on bankruptcy law reforms in six economically advanced jurisdictions, we discover that firms adopt more diversified debt instruments following the reforms. Importantly, firms that are more vulnerable to a tightening of credit supply are more adversely affected by the legal changes, and they also decrease overall debt borrowing and investment. Moreover, firms affected by the reforms use secured debt less frequently, aligning with the idea that these legal changes diminish the protection afforded to secured creditors. In addition, borrowing costs rise after the reforms, implying that creditors may adjust the terms of debt contracts to counterbalance the decreased legal protection.
引用
收藏
页数:24
相关论文
共 56 条
[1]   Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking [J].
Acharya, Viral V. ;
Amihud, Yakov ;
Litov, Lubomir .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 102 (01) :150-166
[2]   Bankruptcy Codes and Innovation [J].
Acharya, Viral V. ;
Subramanian, Krishnamurthy V. .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2009, 22 (12) :4949-4988
[3]   Measuring the ex-ante incentive effects of creditor control rights during bankruptcy reorganization [J].
Agrawal, Ashwini ;
Gonzalez-Uribe, Juanita ;
Martinez-Correa, Jimmy .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 143 (01) :381-408
[4]   FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY [J].
ALTMAN, EI .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1968, 23 (04) :589-609
[5]   Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans [J].
Bae, Kee-Hong ;
Goyal, Vidhan K. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2009, 64 (02) :823-860
[6]   CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS AND THE TREATMENT OF DIVERSE OWNERSHIP INTERESTS - A COMMENT ON ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF SECURED CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY [J].
BAIRD, DG ;
JACKSON, TH .
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 1984, 51 (01) :97-130
[7]   A SIMPLE NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING MODEL OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS [J].
BAIRD, DG ;
PICKER, RC .
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1991, 20 (02) :311-349
[8]   How much should we trust staggered difference-in-differences estimates? * [J].
Baker, Andrew C. ;
Larcker, David F. ;
Wang, Charles C. Y. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 144 (02) :370-395
[9]   THE MATURITY STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE-DEBT [J].
BARCLAY, MJ ;
SMITH, CW .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1995, 50 (02) :609-631
[10]   International Lending: The Role of Lender's Home Country [J].
Beyhaghi, Mehdi ;
Dai, Rui ;
Saunders, Anthony ;
Wald, John .
JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 2021, 53 (06) :1373-1416