Boardroom tenure, financial expertise and bank performance: a nonlinear dynamic framework

被引:1
作者
Varouchas, Evangelos [1 ]
Arvanitis, Stavros [1 ]
Agiomirgianakis, George [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Floros, Christos [1 ]
机构
[1] Hellen Mediterranean Univ, Dept Accounting & Finance, Iraklion 71004, Greece
[2] Hellen Open Univ, Patras, Greece
[3] Hellen Sci Inst Econ Educ & Life Long Learning Res, Athens, Greece
关键词
Boardroom tenure; boardroom financial expertise; bank performance; US; M14; O16; L25; G30; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; ENDOGENEITY; DIRECTORS; MARKET; MATTER; RISK; GMM;
D O I
10.1080/00036846.2024.2414921
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This research investigates the influence of boardroom tenure and financial expertise on US bank performance in a nonlinear dynamic framework. To this aim, we utilize a sample of 305 banks during the 2010-2021 period, and we implement three empirical methodologies: GMM analysis, threshold technique, and quantile approach. Our findings reveal that the individual and interaction effects of boardroom financial expertise and tenure on bank performance are positive. Also, we provide evidence of an inverted U-shaped relation between boardroom tenure and bank performance, and between the board's financial expertise and bank performance. Moreover, threshold analysis shows the presence of threshold effects in the relationship between boardroom tenure, expertise, and performance. Quantile results demonstrate that boardroom financial expertise improves the performance of high-performing banks. In contrast, boardroom tenure enhances the performance of low-performing banks but diminishes the performance of their high-performing counterparts.
引用
收藏
页数:17
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