Political Parties and Public Policies. A Review of the Spanish Evidence

被引:1
作者
Magre-Pont, Jaume [1 ]
Magontier, Pierre [2 ,3 ]
Sole-Olle, Albert [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Barcelona, Inst Econ Barcelona IEB, C-John Maynard Keynes 1-11, Barcelona 08034, Spain
[2] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona Sch Econ BSE, Dept Econ, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[3] Inst Econ Barcelona IEB, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[4] Univ Barcelona, Dept Econ, C-John Maynard Keynes 1-11, Barcelona 08034, Spain
[5] Inst Econ Barcelona IEB, C-John Maynard Keynes 1-11, Barcelona 08034, Spain
关键词
political parties; electoral competition; fiscal policy; D72; H70; R52; ELECTORAL COMPETITION; MAYORAL PARTISANSHIP; 2-PARTY SYSTEM; MATTER; IDEOLOGY; STATES;
D O I
10.1093/cesifo/ifae011
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
To what extent does the incumbent party's identity shape public policies? We investigate this question by examining national and regional policies in Spain. First, we analyze the evolution of voter preferences, and ofthe platforms of the two mainstream parties (Partido Socialista Obrero Espa & ntilde;ol [PSOE] and Partido Popular [PP]), and the newer challenger parties that emerged post-financial crisis (Ciudadanos, Podemos, and Vox). We focus on three key national-level issue dimensions: economic, social, and centralization. As expected, the right-wing PP adopts a more conservative stance on all dimensions compared to the left-wing PSOE. However, the policy gap between these two parties remains relatively stable until the mid-2000s, with party platforms tracking the evolution of citizen preferences. After this period, platforms start to diverge, especially in the case of new parties, which display radical stances on these dimensions. We also provide descriptive evidence suggesting that these platform differences have translated into enacted policies. Second, to offer causal evidence on the effect of party identity on policy decisions, we examine partisan disparities in regional fiscal policies. Our findings reveal significant differences in tax policy following the granting of tax autonomy to the regions, somewhat moderated by tax competition and fiscal limits.
引用
收藏
页码:216 / 239
页数:25
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