Culture and the regulation of entry

被引:45
作者
Davis, Lewis S. [1 ]
Williamson, Claudia R. [2 ]
机构
[1] Union Coll, Dept Econ, 807 Union St, Schenectady, NY 12308 USA
[2] Dept Finance & Econ, Box 9580,312F McCool Hall, Mississippi State, MS 39762 USA
关键词
Culture; Regulation of entry; Individualism; Legal origins; Democracy; ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT; COMMON-LAW; INSTITUTIONS; DIMENSIONS; PRODUCTIVITY; CONSEQUENCES; LANGUAGE; ORIGINS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jce.2016.09.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Does culture affect the manner in which a society regulates the entry of new firms? Our results suggest it does. We find more individualistic countries regulate entry more lightly. We investigate how culture matters presenting evidence of significant interactions between individualism and formal legal and political institutions. Individualism has a greater impact on entry regulation in societies with democratic political institutions or a common law tradition. This outcome is consistent with the idea that culture influences social preference for regulation, and political and legal institutions determine the degree to which those preferences are expressed as policy outcomes. Journal of Comparative Economics 44(4) (2016) 1055-1083. Department of Economics, Union College, 807 Union Street, Schenectady NY, 12308, USA; Department Finance and Economics, Box 9580, 312F McCool Hall, Mississippi State University, Mississippi State, MS, 39762, USA. (C) 2016 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1055 / 1083
页数:29
相关论文
共 109 条
[1]   The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation [J].
Acemoglu, D ;
Johnson, S ;
Robinson, JA .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 91 (05) :1369-1401
[2]   The choice between market failures and corruption [J].
Acemoglu, D ;
Verdier, T .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2000, 90 (01) :194-211
[3]   Oligarchic versus democratic societies [J].
Acemoglu, Daron .
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2008, 6 (01) :1-44
[4]   REGULATION AND DISTRUST [J].
Aghion, Philippe ;
Algan, Yann ;
Cahuc, Pierre ;
Shleifer, Andrei .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2010, 125 (03) :1015-1049
[5]   Institutions and entrepreneurship development in Russia: A comparative perspective [J].
Aidis, Ruta ;
Estrin, Saul ;
Mickiewicz, Tomasz .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING, 2008, 23 (06) :656-672
[6]  
Aidis Ruta., 2007, ECON SYST, V31, P391, DOI DOI 10.1016/J.ECOSYS.2007.08.003
[7]   Public goods and ethnic divisions [J].
Alesina, A ;
Baqir, R ;
Easterly, W .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1999, 114 (04) :1243-1284
[8]   Fractionalization [J].
Alesina, A ;
Devleeschauwer, A ;
Easterly, W ;
Kurlat, S ;
Wacziarg, R .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, 2003, 8 (02) :155-194
[9]   Good-bye Lenin (or not?): The effect of communism on people's preferences [J].
Alesina, Alberto ;
Fuchs-Schuendeln, Nicola .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2007, 97 (04) :1507-1528
[10]   ARTIFICIAL STATES [J].
Alesina, Alberto ;
Easterly, William ;
Matuszeski, Janina .
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2011, 9 (02) :246-277