Who should decide how much information to collect?

被引:0
作者
Li, Youping [1 ,2 ]
Zhang, Jianhu [3 ]
机构
[1] East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China
[2] East China Univ Sci & Technol, Res Inst Digital Econ, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China
[3] Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, 27 Shanda South Rd, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China
来源
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 2024年
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
information collection; information disclosure; privacy; CONSUMER PRIVACY; ECONOMICS; MARKET;
D O I
10.1093/oep/gpae025
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article examines the tradeoffs concerning the collection and disclosure of personal information and considers either the seller or the buyers choosing how much information to collect. We identify two channels through which having heterogeneous buyers make the decision increases social welfare: the full internalization of privacy costs and the customized choice of information levels. Perhaps surprisingly, the buyers voluntarily provide more information than what is mandatorily collected particularly when privacy is a significant concern, which often benefits the seller. Consumer and total welfare are increased with buyers choosing how much information to collect unless the external value of information is sufficiently large relative to the buyers' privacy cost and heterogeneity in valuation. Given the growing privacy concerns surrounding personal data, our analysis supports offering consumers the autonomy, which can result in a Pareto improvement.
引用
收藏
页码:256 / 270
页数:15
相关论文
共 18 条
  • [1] Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets
    Acemoglu, Daron
    Makhdoumi, Ali
    Malekian, Azarakhsh
    Ozdaglar, Asu
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS, 2022, 14 (04) : 218 - 256
  • [2] The Economics of Privacy
    Acquisti, Alessandro
    Taylor, Curtis
    Wagman, Liad
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, 2016, 54 (02) : 442 - 492
  • [3] The economics of social data
    Bergemann, Dirk
    Bonatti, Alessandro
    Gan, Tan
    [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2022, 53 (02) : 263 - 296
  • [4] Competing with Privacy
    Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon
    Hervas-Drane, Andres
    [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2015, 61 (01) : 229 - 246
  • [5] Privacy and personal data collection with information externalities
    Choi, Jay Pil
    Jeon, Doh-Shin
    Kim, Byung-Cheol
    [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2019, 173 : 113 - 124
  • [6] Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases
    Conitzer, Vincent
    Taylor, Curtis R.
    Wagman, Liad
    [J]. MARKETING SCIENCE, 2012, 31 (02) : 277 - 292
  • [7] Online advertising and privacy
    de Corniere, Alexandre
    de Nijs, Romain
    [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2016, 47 (01) : 48 - 72
  • [8] The Ownership of Data
    Dosis, Anastasios
    Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
    [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 2023, 39 (03) : 615 - 641
  • [9] Digital Privacy
    Fainmesser, Itay P.
    Galeotti, Andrea
    Momot, Ruslan
    [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2023, 69 (06) : 3157 - 3173
  • [10] Privacy, property rights and efficiency: The economics of privacy as secrecy
    Hermalin, Benjamin E.
    Katz, Michael L.
    [J]. QME-QUANTITATIVE MARKETING AND ECONOMICS, 2006, 4 (03): : 209 - 239