Environmental legal institutions and management earnings forecasts: Evidence from the establishment of environmental courts in China

被引:4
作者
Liu, Xiaofeng [1 ]
Feng, Hua [2 ]
Tian, Gaoliang [1 ]
Zhang, Ting [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Xian Jiaotong Univeristy, Xian, Peoples R China
[2] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Xian, Peoples R China
[3] Hunan Univ, Changsha, Peoples R China
[4] 2 Lushan South Rd, Changsha, Hunan, Peoples R China
基金
美国国家科学基金会; 中国国家自然科学基金; 国家教育部科学基金资助;
关键词
Environmental legal institution; Environmental court; Management earnings forecasts; Voluntary information disclosure; China; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE; ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; COST; PERFORMANCE; LITIGATION; CRIME; DETERMINANTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.iref.2024.05.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates whether and how managers of highly polluting firms adjust their earnings forecast behaviors in response to the introduction of environmental legal institutions. Using the establishment of environmental courts in China as a quasi-natural experiment, our triple difference-in-differences (DID) estimation shows that environmental courts significantly increase the likelihood of management earnings forecasts for highly polluting firms, compared to nonhighly polluting firms. This association becomes more pronounced for firms with stronger monitoring power, higher environmental litigation risk, and greater earnings uncertainty. Additionally, we show that highly polluting firms improve the precision and accuracy of their management earnings forecasts following the establishment of environmental courts. Furthermore, we provide evidence that our results do not support the opportunistic perspective that suggests managers strategically issue more positive earnings forecasts to inflate stakeholders' expectations subsequent to the implementation of environmental courts. Overall, our research indicates that environmental legal institutions make firms with greater environmental concerns to provide more forward-looking information, thereby alleviating stakeholders' apprehensions regarding future profitability prospects.
引用
收藏
页码:545 / 573
页数:29
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