Firm values can substantially change between the time deal terms are set and the actual deal closing, risking renegotiation, or termination. We find increases in market volatility decrease subsequent deal activity, but only for public targets subject to an interim period. The effect is strongest when volatility is highest, for deals taking longer to close, and for larger targets. Merging parties attempt to shorten the interim window as risk increases. Firm- and industry-level uncertainty measures reveal similar findings, ruling out an unobserved macro variable. We conclude interim uncertainty contributes to understanding the timing and intensity of public firms' merger activity.
机构:
Univ Delaware, Alfred Lerner Coll Business & Econ, Dept Finance, Newark, DE 19716 USAUniv Delaware, Alfred Lerner Coll Business & Econ, Dept Finance, Newark, DE 19716 USA
Bates, TW
Lemmon, ML
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机构:Univ Delaware, Alfred Lerner Coll Business & Econ, Dept Finance, Newark, DE 19716 USA
机构:
Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Ctr Econ Performance, London WC2A 2AE, England
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAStanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
机构:
Univ Delaware, Alfred Lerner Coll Business & Econ, Dept Finance, Newark, DE 19716 USAUniv Delaware, Alfred Lerner Coll Business & Econ, Dept Finance, Newark, DE 19716 USA
Bates, TW
Lemmon, ML
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:Univ Delaware, Alfred Lerner Coll Business & Econ, Dept Finance, Newark, DE 19716 USA
机构:
Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Ctr Econ Performance, London WC2A 2AE, England
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAStanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA