Making the (Letter) Grade: The Incentive Effects of Mandatory Pass/Fail Courses
被引:2
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作者:
Butcher, Kristin
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机构:
Fed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL USA
NBER, Cambridge, England
Wellesley Coll, Dept Econ, Wellesley, MA 02481 USAFed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL USA
Butcher, Kristin
[1
,2
,3
]
Mcewan, Patrick J.
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机构:
Wellesley Coll, Dept Econ, Wellesley, MA 02481 USAFed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL USA
Mcewan, Patrick J.
[3
]
Weerapana, Akila
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机构:
Wellesley Coll, Dept Econ, Wellesley, MA 02481 USAFed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL USA
Weerapana, Akila
[3
]
机构:
[1] Fed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, England
[3] Wellesley Coll, Dept Econ, Wellesley, MA 02481 USA
In fall 2014, Wellesley College began mandating pass/fail grading for courses taken by first-year, first-semester students, although instructors continued to record letter grades. We identify the causal effect of the policy on course choice and performance, using a regression-discontinuity-in-time design. Students shifted to lower-grading science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) courses in the first semester, but did not increase their engagement with STEM in later semesters. Letter grades of first-semester students declined by 0.13 grade points, or 23 percent of a standard deviation. We evaluate causal channels of the grade effect-including sorting into lower-grading STEM courses and declining instructional quality-and conclude that the effect is consistent with declining student effort.