Combinatorial Auctions in Practice†

被引：2
作者：
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio [1 ,2 ]
Parkes, David C. [3 ]
Steinberg, Richard [1 ]
机构：
[1] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London, England
[2] Univ Basque Country, Ikerbasque Fdn, Bilbao, Spain
[3] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE | 2024年 / 62卷 / 02期
关键词：
ASCENDING PRICES; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; REPEATED GAMES; SCHOOL MEALS; CLOCK; PROCUREMENT; DESIGN; COMPETITION; INFORMATION; EFFICIENCY;
D O I：
10.1257/jel.20221679
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We survey the uses of combinatorial auctions that have been deployed in practice, giving emphasis to their key representational and economic aspects. In addition, we discuss behavioral economics considerations on both the bidder and auctioneer sides of the market, and the interrelated topics of simplicity and trust, highlighting key opportunities for future work. ( JEL D44, D91)
引用
收藏
页码：517 / 553
页数：37
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