Recycling price and service of a platform-based WEEE reverse supply chain under government subsidy

In this paper, we form a platform-based WEEE reverse supply chain consisted of a recycling center and an online recycling platform. The recycling center collects WEEE through the online recycling platform operated with entrusted or agent modes. The government provides subsidy for WEEE recycling and disposal. Both members have capital and ability to provide the recycling service. We build Stackelberg game models to explore the impacts of the platform operation mode and the recycling service mode. The analysis shows that in the entrusted (agent) platform mode the introduction of government subsidy can increase (decrease) the recycling price, the recycling service level and the profits for two members. Moreover, in the entrusted platform mode, the platform service mode can generate a higher recycling price, a better recycling service and higher profits for two members. In the agent platform mode, the self-supporting service mode can generate a better recycling service and a higher profit for the recycling center while the platform service mode can generate a higher recycling price and a higher profit for the online recycling platform. Finally, in two recycling service modes, the agent (entrusted) platform mode can generate a higher recycling price if the commission rate falls behind (exceeds) the threshold. In the self-supporting service mode, the agent platform mode can generate a better recycling service, while the entrusted platform mode can generate higher profits for two members. In the platform service mode, the entrusted platform mode can generate a better recycling service and higher profits for two members.