Analysis of Biometric-Based Cryptographic Key Exchange Protocols-BAKE and BRAKE

Biometric authentication methods offer high-quality mechanisms to confirm the identity of individuals in security systems commonly used in the modern world, such as physical access control, online banking, or mobile device unlocking. They also find their application in cryptographic solutions, which allow the biometrically authenticated exchange of cryptographic keys between users and services on the internet, despite the fuzziness of biometric data. Such solutions are BAKE (biometrics-authenticated key exchange) and BRAKE (biometric-resilient authenticated key exchange) protocols, upon which our work is based. However, the direct application of fuzzy biometrics in cryptography, which relies heavily on the accuracy of single-bit secret values, is not trivial. Therefore, this paper is devoted to analyzing the security of this idea and the feasibility of implementing biometric AKE (authenticated key exchange) protocols, with an emphasis on the BRAKE protocol. As the results of our analysis, we discuss BRAKE's limitations and vulnerabilities, which need to be appropriately addressed to implement the protocol in modern systems.