How do crises affect authority structures in international regime complexes? The international order is characterized by regime complexes consisting of ever more overlapping institutions competing for authority. Most complexes consist of established institutions facing a growing number of more recently created institutional contenders. We argue that crises can alter the competitive structure of regime complexes. From the perspective of states, crisis situations can provide newly created contenders-designed as institutional alternatives-with functional advantages over established institutions. Long-established institutions tend to be highly institutionalized, decreasing flexibility and speed of decision-making. Thus, during crises, states may shift their cooperative activities away from inert institutions and to newly created, more flexible alternatives that are less encompassing. We test the plausibility of our claim by studying the effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the regime complex of financial assistance (FA). The results of a qualitative process analysis of institutional crisis responses combined with a comparative network analysis of the FA complex support our argument. The COVID-19 pandemic provided an opportunity for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank to position themselves as crisis-proof alternatives for developing countries to established institutions like the World Bank.
