Sequential school choice with public and private schools

被引：3

作者：

Andersson, Tommy ^{[1
]}

Dur, Umut ^{[2
]}

Ertemel, Sinan ^{[3
]}

Kesten, Onur ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Lund Univ, Dept Econ, Lund, Sweden

[2] North Carolina State Univ, Dept Econ, Raleigh, NC 27695 USA

[3] Istanbul Tech Univ, Dept Econ, Istanbul, Turkiye

[4] Univ Sydney, Sch Econ, Sydney, Australia

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2024年 / 63卷 / 02期

关键词：

COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; MECHANISMS; ENROLLMENT; IMPLEMENT;

D O I：

10.1007/s00355-024-01527-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate sequential two-stage admission systems with public and private schools. A sequential notion of truthfulness, called straightforwardness, is introduced. Contrary to one-stage systems, sequentiality leads to a trade-off between the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and non-wastefulness. We identify the unique set of rules for two-stage systems that guarantees the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and reduces waste. Existing admission systems in T & uuml;rkiye and Sweden are analyzed within our general framework.

引用

页码：231 / 276

页数：46

共 47 条

[1] The Boston Public School match [J].