Earnings pressure and corporate carbon emissions: Empirical evidence from listed firms in China

被引:9
作者
Song, Yan [1 ]
Cai, Lijun [1 ]
Zhang, Ming [2 ]
机构
[1] Xidian Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Xian 710126, Peoples R China
[2] China Univ Min & Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Xuzhou 221116, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Earnings pressure; Carbon emissions; Firm 's decision; Green sustainable development; ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE; TEMPORAL ANALYSIS; GREEN INNOVATION; MANAGEMENT; COMPENSATION; GOVERNANCE; EXPECTATIONS; INVESTMENTS; BEHAVIOR; SUBSIDY;
D O I
10.1016/j.resconrec.2024.107657
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Based on the perspective of externality theory, this paper takes Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2020 as the research object, and empirically investigates the impact of earnings pressure on corporate carbon emissions and its intrinsic mechanism through ordinary least squares regression, and finds that: earnings pressure has a significant positive impact on corporate carbon emissions. Faced with earnings pressure, firms tend to prioritize short-term interests, which will lead to an increase in carbon emissions through the mechanism of reducing green innovation inputs and increasing the level of financing constraints. Additional analysis demonstrates that when the CEO of an enterprise has greater power and the firm is a local state-owned enterprise (SOE), earnings pressure has a significant boosting effect on carbon emissions; and when the firm refers to non-policy-focused industries and faces a lower litigation risk, the earnings pressure has a significant positive effect on carbon emissions as well.
引用
收藏
页数:14
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