The dynamics of bank debt renegotiation in Europe: A survival analysis approach

被引：9
作者：
Godlewski, Christophe J. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Haute Alsace, F-67000 Strasbourg, France
[2] EM Strasbourg Business Sch, LaRGE Res Ctr, PEGE, F-67000 Strasbourg, France
来源：
ECONOMIC MODELLING | 2015年 / 49卷
关键词：
renegotiation process; bank loans; multiple failure-time data; Cox model; Europe; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; FINANCIAL CONTRACTS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; CREDITOR RIGHTS; PRIVATE CREDIT; ENFORCEMENT; INFORMATION; DESIGN; CONSTRAINTS; DEFAULT;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econmod.2015.03.017
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Debt renegotiation matters for the borrower-lender relationship to ensure the credit agreement is regularly amended to include new information. I investigate the determinants of the dynamics of bank loan renegotiations using a sample of 1 600 amendments to private debt contracts in Europe. Employing a stratified Cox-type hazard model, I find that initial loan terms, banking pool features, amendments' characteristics, and the legal environment significantly influence the duration time between renegotiations. Contract complexity, informational frictions in the borrower-lender relationship, the uncertainty of the economic environment, and the legal protection of creditors play a major role in shaping the dynamics of bank loan renegotiation in Europe. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：19 / 31
页数：13
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