Simulation and Analysis of Cyber-Attack on Modbus Protocol for Smart Grids in Virtual Environment

被引:0
|
作者
Banik, Shampa [1 ]
Manicavasagam, Rajesh [1 ]
Banik, Trapa [1 ]
Banik, Shudipta [2 ]
机构
[1] Tennessee Technol Univ, 1 William Jones Dr, Cookeville, TN 38505 USA
[2] East Delta Univ, Noman Soc, Abdullah Al Noman Rd, Chattogram 4209, Bangladesh
来源
关键词
Smart grid (SG); Control protocols; Modbus; Virtual testbed; Cyber-attacks; Security vulnerabilities; INTRUSION DETECTION;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-031-62277-9_25
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Smart grid capabilities have grown significantly in recent years. The smart grid provides advanced real-time handling of faults, advanced automatic control for efficient electricity transmission, monitoring and collection of the electrical system's capacity, and communication for information sharing. Unfortunately, its exposure to public networks makes it increasingly vulnerable to privacy breaches, vulnerabilities, and cyber-attacks. Cyber security threats and vulnerabilities in smart grid networks have become a primary concern that needs to be addressed before deploying a smart grid. Furthermore, the wide range of protocols increases the attack surface of a smart grid. This study focuses on the vulnerability of Modbus, which is regarded as one of the most prevalent control protocols in smart grid communication networks. This paper presents preliminary findings of analyzing cyber-attacks against the Modbus protocol using a virtual testbed to investigate its effects on the smart grid network protocol. The concept incorporates an emulated Modbus/TCP network environment built from open-source software components that imitate fundamental industrial control features of the smart grid. Finally, we analyze the cycle of a cyber-attack leading through Reconnaissance to a DoS attack on the Modbus/TCP protocol and propose improvements to the test bed for protocol attack detection and mitigation.
引用
收藏
页码:384 / 401
页数:18
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