Dynamic incentive mechanisms in mega project-risk management considering the participation of the insurance company

被引:1
作者
Shi, Qianqian [1 ]
Yao, Longyu [1 ]
Bi, Changwei [1 ]
Zhu, Jianbo [2 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Aeronaut & Astronaut, Coll Econ & Management, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[2] Southeast Univ, Sch Civil Engn, Nanjing, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Megaproject insurance; Risk management; Incentive mechanism; Principal-agent theory; CONSTRUCTION RISK; BEHAVIOR; MODEL;
D O I
10.1108/ECAM-04-2024-0473
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
PurposeThe construction of megaprojects often involves substantial risks. While insurance plays an important role as a traditional risk transfer means, owners and insurance companies may still suffer huge losses during the risk management process. Therefore, considering the strong motivation of insurance companies to participate in the on-site risk management of megaprojects, this study aims to propose a collaborative incentive mechanism involving insurance companies, to optimize the risk management effect and reduce the risk of accidents in megaprojects.Design/methodology/approachBased on principal-agent theory, the research develops the static and dynamic incentive models for risk management in megaprojects, involving both the owner and insurance company. The study examines the primary factors influencing incentive efficiency. The results are numerically simulated with a validation case. Finally, the impact of parameter changes on the stakeholders' benefits is analyzed.FindingsThe results indicate that the dynamic incentive model is available to the achievement of a flexible mechanism to ensure the benefits of contractors while protecting the benefits of the owner and insurance company. Adjusting the incentive coefficients for owners and insurance companies within a specified range promotes the growth of benefits for all parties involved. The management cost and economic benefit allocation coefficients have a positive effect on the adjustment range of the incentive coefficient, which helps implement a more flexible dynamic incentive mechanism to motivate contractors to carry out risk management to reduce risk losses.Originality/valueThis study makes up for the absence of important stakeholders in risk management. Different from traditional megaproject risk management, this model uses insurance companies as bridges to break the island effect of risk management among multiple megaprojects. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by designing appropriate dynamic incentive mechanisms in megaproject risk management through insurance company participation, and provides practical implications to both owner and insurance company on incentive contract making, thus achieving better risk governance of megaprojects.
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页数:22
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