Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters

被引：51

作者：

Bisin, Alberto ^{[1
]}

Lizzeri, Alessandro ^{[1
]}

Yariv, Leeat ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10012 USA

[2] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2015年 / 105卷 / 06期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

SELF-CONTROL; PREFERENCE; HEALTH; DISCOUNT; MODELS; CONSUMPTION; TEMPTATION; DEFICITS; UTILITY; WORLD;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.20131306

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Behavioral economics presents a "paternalistic" rationale for benevolent government intervention. This paper presents a model of public debt where voters have self-control problems and attempt to commit using illiquid assets. In equilibrium, government accumulates debt to respond to individuals' desire to undo their commitments, which leads individuals to rebalance their portfolio, in turn feeding into a demand for further debt accumulation. As a consequence, (i) large (and distortionary) government debt accumulation occurs, and (ii) banning illiquid assets could improve individuals' welfare. These results offer a new rationale for balanced budget rules in constitutions to restrain governments' responses to voters' self-control problems.(JEL D2, D72, D78, H62, H63)

引用

页码：1711 / 1737

页数：27

共 70 条

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