Asymmetric conflict games with an extremist

被引：0

作者：

Park, Youngseok ^{[1
]}

Campbell, Colin ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Konkuk Univ, Dept Econ, 120 Neungdong Ro, Seoul 05029, South Korea

[2] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2024年 / 237卷

关键词：

Conflict games; Asymmetry;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111659

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper extends the conflict game of Baliga and Sj & ouml;str & ouml;m (2012) by allowing for an asymmetry between players. We demonstrate that (i) a player with a greater net gain from playing a hawkish action is more likely to play a hostile action and thereby the risk of war increases with it, and that (ii) an extremist cannot manipulate the conflict via cheap -talk message whenever the properties of actions are asymmetric between the players.

引用

页数：6