central banks;
domestic political economy;
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE;
MONETARY-POLICY RULES;
TRANSPARENCY;
CREDIBILITY;
COMMITMENT;
DISCRETION;
INFLATION;
EVOLUTION;
POLITICS;
LESSONS;
D O I:
10.1111/ecpo.12304
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
In the literature on central banks independence these institutions are considered as being apolitical. In reality, central banks are political actors and their de facto independence changes over time even if their de jure independence remains unvaried. An example of this is the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), whose de facto independence in the past decades has fluctuated significantly because of the pressures of Congress and the President. To counter these pressures, the Fed seeks support from certain interest groups. The success of this behavior is more likely when the President and Congress represent different political parties.
机构:
Michigan State Univ, Dept Econ, 486 W Circle Dr,110 MarshallAdams Hall, E Lansing, MI 48824 USAMichigan State Univ, Dept Econ, 486 W Circle Dr,110 MarshallAdams Hall, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
Lakdawala, Aeimit
Wu, Shu
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Kansas, Dept Econ, 1450 Jayhawk Blvd, Lawrence, KS 66045 USAMichigan State Univ, Dept Econ, 486 W Circle Dr,110 MarshallAdams Hall, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
机构:
Mendel Univ Brno, Fac Business & Econ, Dept Reg & Business Econ, Brno, Czech RepublicMendel Univ Brno, Fac Business & Econ, Dept Reg & Business Econ, Brno, Czech Republic
Adjei, Raymond Kofi
Grega, Libor
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h-index: 0
机构:
Mendel Univ Brno, Fac Reg Dev & Int Studies, Dept Reg & Business Econ, Brno, Czech RepublicMendel Univ Brno, Fac Business & Econ, Dept Reg & Business Econ, Brno, Czech Republic