Mixed Fair Division: A Survey

被引：0

作者：

Liu, Shengxin ^{[1
]}

Lu, Xinhang ^{[2
]}

Suzuki, Mashbat ^{[2
]}

Walsh, Toby ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Harbin Inst Technol, Shenzhen, Peoples R China

[2] UNSW, Sydney, NSW, Australia

来源：

THIRTY-EIGHTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, VOL 38 NO 20 | 2024年

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

APPROXIMATE COMPETITIVE-EQUILIBRIUM; ENVY-FREENESS; ALLOCATIONS; ALGORITHM;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

The fair allocation of resources to agents is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods), and (iii) fair division of indivisible goods with subsidy.

引用

页码：22641 / 22649

页数：9

共 76 条

[21] The Price of Fairness [J].