Open Naturalism and Two Types of Intuition

被引：0

作者：

Cespedes, Esteban ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Catolica Maule, Dept Filosofia, Talca, Chile

[2] Inst Sistemas Complejos Valparaiso, Valparaiso, Chile

[3] Univ Valparaiso, Ctr Estudios Filosofia Log & Epistemol, Valparaiso, Chile

来源：

REVISTA DE HUMANIDADES DE VALPARAISO-RHV | 2024年 / 24期

关键词：

realism; representation; phenomenon; naturalism; ontology;

D O I：

10.22370/rhv2024iss24pp25-43

中图分类号：

B82 [伦理学（道德学）];

学科分类号：

摘要：

As a non-representationalist form of integrating methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism, this work proposes a distinction between phenomenic and rational intuitions. Since this is not a static distinction, it offers a way of observing in which sense the apparent circularity between mental and theoretical representations is not a vicious one. The argument's plausibility will have to be reinforced through considerations about the unstability of ontologies and about how to conceive conflicting intuitions.

引用

页码：25 / 43

页数：19

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