Bi-level generator start-up sequence optimization model for power system restoration considering the DoS attack

被引:0
作者
Sun, Lei [1 ,2 ]
Wang, Han [1 ,2 ]
Li, Mingming [3 ]
Wei, Youwang [1 ,2 ]
Lin, Zhenzhi [4 ]
机构
[1] Hefei Univ Technol, Sch Elect Engn & Automat, Hefei 230009, Peoples R China
[2] Anhui Prov Lab Renewable Energy Utilizat & Energy, Hefei 230009, Peoples R China
[3] State Grid Zhoukou Power Supply Co, Zhoukou 466000, Peoples R China
[4] Zhejiang Univ, Sch Elect Engn, Hangzhou 310027, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Power system restoration; Generator start-up sequence; DoS attack; Mixed-integer linear programming;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijepes.2024.110219
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
The reasonable generator start-up sequence (GSUS) strategy is beneficial to increasing the energy capacity of power systems after a blackout. Since the decision-making strategies of power systems are highly dependent on the cyber system, the denial of service (DoS) attack, as the most common type of cyber attacks, may prevent the generators from being re-started at their desired time and degrade performance of the optimal GSUS strategy in the power system restoration process, which has not been studied in the existing methods. To fill this gap, a bilevel GSUS optimization strategy against the DoS attack is proposed in this work. First, the effects of the DoS attack on the power generation of generators are analyzed and quantified by the generation energy loss. Then, a bi-level optimization model for the GSUS is proposed considering the DoS attack, where the upper-level model, referred to as the attacker model, aims to maximize the energy loss to prolong the restoration of generators by optimizing the time instant of the attack, while the lower-level model, referred to as the defender model, aims to maximize the energy generation by adjusting the optimal GSUS strategy in the restoration process. Both the upper-level and lower-level models are reformulated as mixed-integer linear programing problems, which can be efficiently solved by commercial solvers. Finally, the IEEE 39-bus power system and an actual power system in China are employed to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model.
引用
收藏
页数:11
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