Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements

被引：0

作者：

Chatterjee, Kalyan ^{[1
]}

Chaturvedi, Rakesh ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, 504 Kern, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

[2] FLAME Univ, 255 APJ Abdul Kalam, Pune 412115, India

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2024年 / 146卷

关键词：

Bargaining; Nash bargaining solution; Raiffa's bargaining solution; Negotiation curve; PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Raiffa's solution to the bargaining problem, outlined in Luce and Raiffa (1957), is the point where the negotiation curve - a sequence of points that constitute step-by-step improvements from the status quo in the feasible payoff space - meets (possibly in the limit) the efficient boundary of the feasible region. A bargaining model with interim agreements yields a negotiation curve in equilibrium (in the spirit of Raiffa), and as the bargaining frictions disappear, the Raiffa path of payoffs converges to the Nash solution.

引用

页码：105 / 120

页数：16