POLITICAL COMPETITION IN THE JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON THE DECISION OF THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT IN ADI NO. 4.650

This article analyses a specific approach to the judicial oversight of the democratic process by constitutional courts, the Theory of Political Competition. We argue that the theory offers methodological insights that may instruct constitutional courts, including the Brazilian Supreme Court, on how to handle constitutional disputes concerning the validity of electoral rules that structure the democratic process. Based on the theory's proposed approach, we offer a reinterpretation of the Brazilian Supreme Court's decision on the ADI No. 4.650, whereby we emphasize a structural concern with the protection of political competition. We argue that both the majority and the dissenting opinions shared a structural concern with political competition in their assessment of the constitutionality of corporate electoral donations, and that there exist sound reasons for the court not to consider such donations an extreme anticompetitive practice and, thus, unconstitutional.