Are ethical explanations explanatory? Meta-ethical beliefs shape judgments about explanations for social change

Why were women given the right to vote? "Because it is morally wrong to deny women the right to vote." This explanation does not seem to fit the typical pattern for explaining an event: rather than citing a cause, it appeals to an ethical claim. Do people judge ethical claims to be genuinely explanatory? And if so, why? In Studies 1 ( N = 220) and 2 ( N = 293), we find that many participants accept ethical explanations for social change and that this is predicted by their meta -ethical beliefs in moral progress and moral principles, suggesting that these participants treat morality as a directional feature of the world, somewhat akin to a causal force. In Studies 3 ( N = 513) and 4 ( N = 328), we find that participants recognize this relationship between ethical explanations and meta -ethical commitments, using the former to make inferences about individuals' beliefs in moral progress and moral principles. Together these studies demonstrate that our beliefs about the nature of morality shape our judgments of explanations and that explanations shape our inferences about others' moral commitments.