The article discusses the problem of a correct description of reality in science and philosophy, taking into account the acceptance of the many -world hypothesis. Many -worlds are understood as modern physical hypotheses that allow the existence of other universes (many -world interpretation, chaotic inflation, string landscape, and others). It is shown that these models are likely to challenge the traditional intellectual intuition on which classical science is built: they require new methodological approaches, and perhaps a new epistemology in general. Some requirements of classical logic, based on principles such as the laws of non -contradiction or the excluded middle, may turn out to be incorrect and even counterintuitive under many -world hypotheses. It is suggested that some logical systems (paraconsistent logic, quantum logic) may in the future become an ontological and epistemological foundation for the concepts of many world physical reality. It is concluded that the considered multi -world models in conjunction with the indicated logics are more intuitively acceptable, since they allow getting rid of not only a number of cosmological problems (for example, fine tuning), but also problems of a logical and mathematical nature arising from the considered traditional requirements for formal systems.
