Foreign ownership and M&A activity: Evidence from China

被引:0
作者
Liu, Hao [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Ye, Xiaofen [4 ]
Zhang, Qun [1 ,2 ,3 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Sch Finance, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Inst Financial Openness & Asset Management, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[3] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Southern China Inst Fortune Management Res, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[4] Xiamen Univ, Sch Econ, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R China
[5] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Higher Educ Mega Ctr, Sch Finance, Room 416B,Fac Off Bldg, CN-510006 Guangzhou, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Foreign ownership; Merger and acquisition; Monitoring; Corporate governance; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; RETURN VOLATILITY; AGENCY COSTS; RISK-TAKING; ACQUISITIONS; MERGERS; STOCK; FIRM; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.najef.2024.102179
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the effect of foreign investors' shareholdings on merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in Chinese listed companies, using manually collected data on foreign investors from 30 international jurisdictions between 2010 and 2020. The empirical findings highlight the significant influence of foreign ownership in reducing the frequency of corporate M&A activities and improving M&A performance. Notably, these effects are primarily driven by foreign institutional ownership rather than foreign individual ownership. Additionally, the negative effect of foreign ownership on M&A frequency is robust to alternative measures of foreign ownership and various model specifications, including instrumental variable estimation. Interestingly, the negative effect is particularly pronounced in firms with extensive analyst coverage and without short-selling constraints, suggesting that foreign investors' involvement plays a complementary role in established governance structures. Our channel analyses also reveal that foreign investors from jurisdictions with strong corporate governance exert a more substantial monitoring effect. However, the reduction effect is weakened in cases where there is a high cultural distance between mainland China and the jurisdiction of origin of each foreign investor.
引用
收藏
页数:24
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