Evolutionary Game Model of the Recycler and Manufacturer under the Chinese Government's Premium and Penalty Mechanism

Based on game theory, this study established game models composed of recyclers and manufacturers under the government's static and dynamic premium and penalty mechanisms, and then explored the interaction mechanisms of the behavioral strategies for both players. This study analyzed the influence of reward-penalty intensity and the government's recovery and utilization on the recyclers' and manufacturers' recovery strategies. Furthermore, the study analyzed numerical and simulation samples. Results indicated that government regulation and recyclers' and manufacturers' recycling strategies under the dynamic premium and penalty mechanism effectively resolved the instability of the behavioral strategy generated by the static premium and penalty mechanism and achieved evolutionary stability among the three players. The possibility of manufacturers choosing to actively recycle was directly proportional to the government's premium and penalty intensity and inversely proportional to the difficulty coefficient of recovery. The premium and penalty intensity of the government was proportional to the target recovery and recycling rates of waste products.The research in this paper provides a strong basis for government decision making.