What is fiscal sociology about? An argument for the category of the tax state

被引:0
作者
Dopking, Lars [1 ]
机构
[1] Deutsch Hist Inst Rom, Via Aurelia Antica 391, I-00165 Rome, Italy
来源
BERLINER JOURNAL FUR SOZIOLOGIE | 2024年 / 34卷 / 03期
关键词
Fiscal sociology; Tax state; Worlds of taxation; German-Italian comparison; Fiscal relations; TAXATION; COMPETITION; TRANSFORMATION; CAPITALISM; DEMOCRACY; POWER;
D O I
10.1007/s11609-024-00530-7
中图分类号
C91 [社会学];
学科分类号
030301 ; 1204 ;
摘要
Macroscopic fiscal sociology is haunted by a category problem: it leaves open whether its unit of comparison are worlds, families, systems, regimes or structures of taxation. This categorical confusion points to theoretical problems. For by understanding its epistemic object - taxes - primarily as a mere expression of ideas, mentalities, domestic politics or macroeconomics, the literature ignores their sociological, i.e. relational quality. The analysis of taxes as fiscal relations, meanwhile, does not only provide for more adequate descriptions. It also allows for taxes themselves being attributed an explanatory role: depending on which fiscal relations are established in what way, the macroscopic political and social effects can be very different. To accommodate for this, the article proposes to revitalise the category of the tax state. In contrast to traditional approaches, the tax state is here defined as the center of a network of fiscal relations in which the validity ("Geltung") and content of tax regimes are contested; while its evolution can be mapped by means of four process terms: professionalization, state pervasion ("Durchstaatlichung"), politizisation and geo-fiscalization. The advantages of this conceptual innovation are demonstrated by briefly comparing the Italian and German tax states. The article concludes with an argument for a comparative approach to the tax state.
引用
收藏
页码:377 / 401
页数:25
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