Mixing prisoner's dilemma games on higher-order networks

The prisoner's dilemma game is a paradigmatic example of a plight situation in which different individuals vie for maximal payoffs. And it has been shown that interaction networks that host such individuals have an immense impact on individual strategy choices. In this paper, we advance this subject by mixing the two- person prisoner's dilemma and various multiplayer prisoner's dilemma games and explore the role of 2-order simplicial complexes on the evolutionary dynamics. In the studied model, the fraction of multiplayer prisoner's dilemma games on the network can be indirectly controlled by adjusting the ratio of 2-simplex complexes in the network. Through large-scale simulations, we show that by adjusting this ratio, the level of cooperation can be enhanced by a mechanism that is unique to higher-order networks. In particular, the strategic unity of the triangles in the network can foster the stability of cooperation and its spreading through enhanced network reciprocity. These results thus reveal benefits of higher-order interactions on cooperation that have thus far, on classical networks, been reserved only for games played in groups, such as the public goods game.