Media's Influence on Citizen Demand for Public Goods

被引:0
作者
Keefer, Philip [1 ]
Khemani, Stuti [2 ]
机构
[1] Interamer Dev Bank, Washington, DC 20577 USA
[2] World Bank, Washington, DC USA
关键词
FIELD EXPERIMENT; ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; VOTING-BEHAVIOR; CLIENTELISM; INFORMATION; EDUCATION; BIAS; CORRUPTION; AUDITS;
D O I
10.1086/725019
中图分类号
K9 [地理];
学科分类号
0705 ;
摘要
Low voter interest in politicians who promise public goods is common in clientelist settings and a challenge to development. We show that access to media can increase interest. Households in Benin, responding to novel survey vignettes, generally support politicians who offer government jobs for a few at the expense of health and education for all. However, some households have exogenously greater access to community radio, which broadcasts programs designed to increase awareness of the importance of health and education. These households express significantly less support for clientelist politicians, indicating a role for media in shifting political equilibria away from clientelism.
引用
收藏
页码:1615 / 1651
页数:37
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