Choosing innovation alliance governance structure: The roles of performance feedback and top management team characteristics

被引:0
作者
Su, Taoyong [1 ]
Chen, Yongheng [2 ]
Liu, Wei [1 ]
Ji, Junzhe [3 ]
机构
[1] Tongji Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Normal Univ, Sch Finance & Business, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Glasgow, Adam Smith Business Sch, Glasgow, Scotland
关键词
performance feedback; innovation alliance governance structure; equity and non-equity; TMT tenure; TMT educational-level diversity; BEHAVIORAL-THEORY; FIRM PERFORMANCE; ASPIRATION PERFORMANCE; PARTNER SELECTION; TRANSACTION COST; JOINT VENTURES; CEO TENURE; SEARCH; ORGANIZATION; DIVERSITY;
D O I
10.1017/jmo.2024.17
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
While the importance of innovation alliance for high-technological firms is well-documented, existing literature provides little guidance on the role of performance feedback in an alliance governance structure choice. Drawing on performance feedback theory, this study sheds light on the association between performance deviating (either above or below) from firms' social aspirations and the governance structure choice of innovation alliances. Using an unbalanced panel of Chinese biopharmaceutical firms spanning from 2007 to 2020, we find that firms experiencing negative performance feedback prefer a non-equity innovation alliance structure, whereas those with positive performance feedback are more likely to adopt an equity one. The strength of these relationships is contingent on top management team average tenure and educational-level diversity. Our findings both provide theoretical and practical insights into guiding how firms under different states of performance feedback select alliance governance structures.
引用
收藏
页数:23
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