Condorcet-Style Paradoxes for Majority Rule with Infinite Candidates

被引:0
|
作者
Rachar, Matthew [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Free Univ Berlin, Berlin, Germany
[2] Douglas Coll, New Westminster, BC, Canada
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Condorcet Paradox; Preference Aggregation; Majority Rule; Infinite Candidates; AGGREGATING SETS; JUDGMENTS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B81 [逻辑学(论理学)];
学科分类号
010104 ; 010105 ;
摘要
I present two possibility results and one impossibility result about a situation with three voters under a pairwise majoritarian aggregation function voting on a countably infinite number of candidates. First, from individual orders with no maximal or minimal element, it is possible to generate an aggregate order with a maximal or minimal element. Second, from dense individual orders, it is possible to generate a discrete aggregate order. Finally, I show that, from discrete orders with a particular property, namely the finite-distance property, it is not possible to generate a dense aggregate order.
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页数:18
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