Platform investment and seller competition in two-sided markets

被引：0

作者：

Angelini, Francesco ^{[1
]}

Castellani, Massimiliano ^{[1
]}

Zirulia, Lorenzo ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bologna, Dept Stat Sci Paolo Fortunati, Piazza Teatini 10, I-47921 Rimini, RN, Italy

[2] Univ Milan, Dept Econ Management & Quantitat Methods, Via Conservatorio 7, I-20122 Milan, MI, Italy

[3] Univ L Bocconi, ICRIOS, Milan, MI, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2025年 / 144卷 / 01期

关键词：

Two-sided markets; Platform investment; Competition; D43; L13; L86; PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION; VALUE CREATION; SEARCH;

D O I：

10.1007/s00712-024-00874-x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Platforms can create value within their ecosystems through their investments. In this paper, we model a monopolistic platform choosing the level of a demand-enhancing investment and the membership fees that sellers and buyers pay to access the platform. We find that platform size and quality are large when the degree of product differentiation among sellers and investment productivity are high. Platform profit and users' surplus are aligned. If the platform sells a product under its brand, incentives to invest are higher, compared to a pure marketplace, and sellers' surplus can be larger if the degree of product differentiation is low.

引用

页码：1 / 29

页数：29

共 57 条

[21] INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN OPEN-SOURCE AND PROPRIETARY TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS [J].