The role of imperfect market structure in the employment effect of emissions trading scheme in China: A theoretical extension and empirical investigation

The Chinese government aims to balance employment stabilization and emissions reduction when it initiates an emissions trading scheme (ETS) to control carbon emissions. However, the policymakers should not neglect the role of imperfectly competitive market structure and market power from incumbent firms. In view of this, classical framework of Berman and Bui's (2001) is extended in this paper to clarify the theoretical mechanism of employment effect of the ETS considering firm-level market power. In addition, based on the firm-level panel data from 2008 to 2019 of China, the employment effect of each pilot ETS is measured with the method of difference-in-difference-in-differences. Then a moderating effect model is established to verify the role of firm-level market power on the heterogeneous employment effect among the pilot ETSs. Moreover, the employment effect is further decomposed to evaluate the influential mechanism from the perspective of firms' strategic behavior. It is found that there is negative employment effect of China's ETS policy, due to the significant moderating role of firm-level market power. This decrease in labor demand is mainly dominated by a negative output effect rather than a positive substitution effect because strategic allowance sellers with stronger market power tend to hire fewer employees to reduce carbon emissions by controlling production scale. However, the heterogeneity of policy effects resulted by market structure is also identified in different pilot regions. Employment dividend has been found in Beijing and Tianjin where strategic allowance buyers manipulate the carbon market and hire more employees to consolidate their market power. Therefore, policymakers should improve the design of the ETS to overcome the adverse employment effect duo to the region-specific market structure.