Revolutions and corruption

被引:3
作者
Ammons, Joshua D. [1 ]
Shakya, Shishir [2 ]
机构
[1] George Mason Univ, Dept Econ, 4400 Univ Drive Fairfax, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
[2] Appalachian State Univ, Walker Coll Business, Dept Econ, 416 Howard St,Peacock Hall, Boone, NC 28608 USA
关键词
Revolution; Corruption; Regime change; Corruption persistence; D73; K42; O17; P16; BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION; INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY; PERCEIVED CORRUPTION; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; NONVIOLENT; CULTURE; ENFORCEMENT; DYNAMICS; ECONOMY; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1007/s11127-024-01173-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate the relationship between successful revolutions and corruption using data on revolutionary campaigns since 1900 and corruption measures retrieved from the Varieties of Democracy database. We find that successful nonviolent and violent revolutions produce null effects on corruption; education decreases corruption; and upon adjusting for the moderating effect of education, violent revolutions induce corruption. Our results imply that classic narratives celebrating such upheavals as corruption-limiting are oversimplified and optimistic. Our analysis challenges conventional wisdom and contributes an instructive, empirically-grounded assessment of the revolution's corruption consequences to the scholarship.
引用
收藏
页码:355 / 376
页数:22
相关论文
共 120 条
[11]   Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians [J].
Avis, Eric ;
Ferraz, Claudio ;
Finan, Frederico .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2018, 126 (05) :1912-1964
[12]   A theory of misgovernance [J].
Banerjee, AV .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1997, 112 (04) :1289-1332
[13]   Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis [J].
Barr, Abigail ;
Serra, Danila .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2010, 94 (11-12) :862-869
[14]   Common political culture: Evidence on regional corruption contagion [J].
Becker, Sascha O. ;
Egger, Peter H. ;
Seidel, Tobias .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2009, 25 (03) :300-310
[15]   Coups, regime transitions, and institutional consequences [J].
Bennett, Daniel L. ;
Bjornskov, Christian ;
Gohmann, Stephan F. .
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS, 2021, 49 (02) :627-643
[16]   Non-violent resistance and the quality of democracy [J].
Bethke, Felix S. ;
Pinckney, Jonathan .
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE SCIENCE, 2021, 38 (05) :503-523
[17]   An offer you can't refuse: murdering journalists as an enforcement mechanism of corrupt deals [J].
Bjornskov, Christian ;
Freytag, Andreas .
PUBLIC CHOICE, 2016, 167 (3-4) :221-243
[18]   Can bribes buy protection against international competition? [J].
Bjornskov, Christian .
REVIEW OF WORLD ECONOMICS, 2012, 148 (04) :751-775
[19]   Combating Corruption: On the Interplay between Institutional Quality and Social Trust [J].
Bjornskov, Christian .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 2011, 54 (01) :135-159
[20]  
Blanchard O, 2001, IMF STAFF PAPERS, V48, P171