The regulation of good and evi promotes cooperation in public goods game

The topic of how to solve cooperation dilemmas has been intensively investigated. Numerous mechanisms have been presented to promote cooperation level by introducing various third-party strategies. This paper considers the more realistic strategy named punishing evil and promoting good (PEPG) in the public goods game, whose fundamental action is cooperation. Players selecting this strategy can not only reward cooperators but also penalize defectors, effectively amalgamating the advantages of both rewarders and punishers. Moreover, distinct strategic choices lead to dynamic changes in players' reputation, which in turn significantly influence their income distribution. Notably, individuals with elevated reputation are entitled to allocate more benefits rather than homogeneous distribution. Simulation experiments demonstrate that the PEPG strategy is pivotal in eliminating defectors and fostering cooperative behavior. Importantly, three intriguing phenomena are displayed in this research, including the resurgence of defectors, the polarization of reputation and the disparities of payoffs, all of which help us understand the emergence of cooperation in the real world.